The recent decision in the Court of Session in Edinburgh in the case of Janet Johnstone brings the issue of end-of-life decisions back into the forefront of public debate. Many groups in the community and many individuals have a special interest in what we should do in respect of those whose conscious life is at an end although their physical existence is not.
As most will know, the Scottish courts were, for the first time, being asked to reach a decision about whether or not it would be lawful to withdraw nasogastric feeding from a woman in persistent vegetative state (PVS) . The As in the case of Tony Bland, the outcome in Mrs Johnstone's case was that the court authorised the removal of the assisted feeding/hydration. Since no appeal was made from this judgment, Mrs Johnstone's family and doctors agreed to withdraw the nasogastric feeding and Mrs Johnstone died some two weeks later. There is no doubt about the beneficent intentions of those who sought leave to allow her to die, but there is a massive paradox in the law.
When asked to adjudicate, the courts in the UK have built tests on which they can reach conclusions about whether or not the life of a person can be ended -most commonly in cases concerning patients in persistent vegetative state and handicapped neonates. By utilising effectively a "best interests" test, they have found it possible to endorse the clinical recommendation that life should not be prolonged. Yet, these are the two groups who might be said to be most acutely vulnerable, and in the light of that, those most in need of a stringent legal test. Put another way, if a competent, adult human being requests assistance in ending a life which for them is intolerable (that is, it is no longer in their own "best interests" to survive) any doctor who assisted in that request would be guilty of a criminal offence. Yet where wishes are not known or could never have been expressed, the courts take upon themselves the task of reaching a conclusion, and render the doctor non-liable. This is particularly interesting in Mrs Johnstone's case. Unlike the Bland case, where the House of Lords was hearing the case as a civil one, the Court of Session heard the case with Scotland's Chief Criminal Law Officer -the Lord Advocateinvolved. Scotland's senior Civil Judge (The Lord President) set out the framework within which decisions could be taken ("best interests", or that treatment would provide no benefit for the patient) whilst expressing the view that not every case would have to go before a court (unlike the English position). In a move which takes Scots law ahead of its English counterpart, the Lord Advocate subsequently issued a policy statement to the effect that -whilst he also did not feel that every case would necessarily have to be heard by a court -he would offer immunity from prosecution to every doctor who disconnected the nasogastric feeding from any patient in PVS where the Court of Session had authorised this.
The net result is that doctors and families may choose to continue to make decisions on the basis of the Lord President's guidelines, but only those who have court authority will be guaranteed immunity from prosecution. The prudent doctor will doubtless seek court approval before acting to remove the feeding. However, this still does not address the fundamental issues. Although, in my view, the doctor in Scotland is in a much safer legal position than his/her counterpart elsewhere in the UK because a direct and unequivocal statement concerning criminal liability has been made, there remain a number of residual doubts about the basis on which the law will judge such cases.
These are too many and varied to consider in such a short article, but two are especially deserving of attention. The thrust of UK decisions in cases of this sort has been that the decision is based on "best interests". Although the Scottish courts defined this as being treatment which is no longer of benefit to the given patient, it remains a vague test and one which is relatively unhelpful once a diagnosis of PVS has been made. The very crux of the diagnosis is that the patient has no interests at all, far less best ones, so how is one to decide that the test has been met? The point is that -in our fear of addressing the possibility that there may be conditions which make death preferable to life -for example, where a competent person has decided that this is so and in an effort to avoid confronting the whole euthanasia debate, we have developed tests which are philosophically and ethically flawed in order that the "right" decision can be made.
All individuals and professionals who deal with friends, relatives, clients and patients are aware that sometimes maintaining existence is not the humane option, yet our law will penalise anyone who helps the person who asks for relief. At the same time, it will apparently not penalise those (so long as they are clinicians) who stop providing sustenance when nobody can know what would have been chosen by the individual and on the basis of a test which is inherently flawed.
Moreover, doctors cannot escape the consequences of their actions on the basis of the acts/omissions doctrine. Whether it is an act or an omission to suspend nutrition and hydration is legally irrelevant in such cases, because there is a pre-existing duty of care which renders them as liable for their omissions as for their acts. In addition, the intention is precisely the same as is the motive. In other words, whether we like it or not, the time has surely come for the whole issue of end-of-life decisions to be reopened.
Analysis of legal decisions from selective nontreatment of handicapped infants, to patients in PVS, to double effect, to competent refusal of lifesustaining treatment to active euthanasia shows one major thing -that our law is inconsistent, sometimes incoherent. Yet, one of the things that we can legitimately expect of our law is formal justice -that fairness will prevail. For the moment, only those who have no say can apparently be helped by the legal process towards the termination of an existence which we would not wish for ourselves. But What we have seen yet again is an avoidance of the main question by reacting to a particular set of circumstances and attempting to accommodate them. Of course, the court was not asked to consider the means by which Mrs Johnstone might die, only whether or not this should be permitted, and the judiciary can only answer those questions which are put before it. Based on this truth, it seems inevitable that ad hocery, however well intentioned, will continue to dog this most sensitive of issues. Moreover, in striving to reach appropriate conclusions, our judges will be thrown back on tests which are at best arguable and at worst inappropriate.
What the Bland and Johnstone cases surely argue for is: 1) a legislative framework which concedes that there is no absolute commitment to the sanctity of all life, and 2) guidelines -based on principle -which can point the decision-makers to a consistent, accountable and transparent decision. Or, of course, legislation might outlaw all such decisions. Whatever the outcome, there is a value in certainty, both for those caring for these patients and for those of us who may one day end up in such situations.
